ARMS CONTROL AND WORLD PEACE

KENNETH CHINEDU OKOCHA

UD321564BIN40738

ATLANTIC INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

HONOLULU, HAWAI

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KENNETH CHINEDU OKOCHA

UD321564BIN40738

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ABSTRACT

At the heart of securing World Peace is the need to impose constraints on war which has always been one of the daunting challenges that has faced humankind from the ancient times to the present contemporary era.

The atomic era heralded and brought to the limelight the danger that the possession of nuclear weapon entails and has therefore, created the imperative requirement for a fundamental transformation of the international system.

Hence the regulation of armaments which has been on the agenda of nations for centuries became more prominent as a result of the nuclear age. Therefore, while some measures of Arms control could not be achieved because of the Cold War and the rivalry between the Superpowers during the bipolar World Order, some scholars of international relations have opined that some measures of Arms Control may be achieved now that the World has moved from a bipolar World Order that was characterized by rivalry and competition for acquisition of military capabilities to a unipolar or multipolar World Order.

The current arms race going on in Asia and the Middle East, notably North Korea and Iran despite the end of the Cold War and subsequently the bipolar World Order, coupled with the fact that acquisition of Nuclear Weapon which has become a by-product of peaceful nuclear programmes and delivery systems tend to depict as illusory the possibility of achieving some measures of Arms control and thereby enhancing and guaranteeing World Peace.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background to Study

In the international society, the state is the basic element.[1]And as long as states remain the basic element in the international system, they are basically responsible for their national security.

As a way of enhancing their national security, weapons have been developed over times as an artificial extension of man's ability to fight. Theodore Couloumbis and James Wolfe argue that traditionally , weapon fulfils three functions which include (1) protection against other people (groups, tribes, nations) as well as against animals; (ii) the improvement of one's economic condition through hunting and acquisition of goods; and (iii) the enhancement of prestige, through increased ability to intimidate others. [2]

[1]See Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since1945, 5th and ed. (London: Longman, 1990),p. 89.

[2]Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: power and justice, (New Jersey: Prentice- hall, 1978), p. 187.

The Second World War necessitated the development of the atomic bomb that brought an end to that War through its devastation of two Japanese Cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then, nuclear scientists have never doubted that the knowledge of the fission bomb technology would sooner or later be globally dispersed.

The possession of nuclear power in this contemporary era has become the evidence of strength, or when put in another way, is viewed as a symbol of national power. Adeniran argues that the rapid advance in technology made the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United kingdom, France and China who were the members of the nuclear club for a decade, the determiners of world values.[3] Hence the emergence of nuclear power and the spread of its technology has brought about a cataclysmic change in the world's strategic environment. [4]

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[3]See Tunde Adeniran, "Nuclear Proliferation and Black Africa: The Coming Crisis of Choice" in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 4, October 1981, p. 673.

[4]ibid

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From the foregoing, one could reasonably say that states with high political incentives are likely to join in the acquisition of nuclear weapons either merely because of the symbolic value of being a nuclear power or because of the dominating effects that nuclear power acquisition by a regional competitor or adversary would have .[5]

It is pertinent to assert that the advancement of a nuclear arms race is a phenomenal preoccupation of the technologically more developed countries that have acquired nuclear reactor and a highly developed nuclear technology. Adeniran argues that nuclear proliferation can be said to have been facilitated by two reasons. The first can be said to be the fear expressed by the super – powers and middle range powers which have a spill-over effect that has conditioned the perception of the technologically less developed countries and secondly, the attempt by the technologically developed countries to pay for oil

[5]Ibid. , p. 675. Also see Geoffrey Kemp and Steven Miller, "The Arms Transfer Phenomenon" in Andrew Pierre (ed), Arms Transfer and American Foreign Policy, (New York: New York University Press, 1979), p. 47.

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to the developing Countries through the transfer of nuclear technology and other arms deal.[6]

While lending credence to Adeniran's view, Cynthia Cannizzo says:

African states tend to buy weaponry with regard to their

internal situations, but western states tend to sell

weaponry with regard to factorsexternal to African politics

and security,such as their own need for exports, need for

oil or strategic minerals, and the need foraccess to other

parts of the world especiallythe Middle East.[7]

[6]Adeniran, Op. Cit. , p. 675. Also See Philip J. Farley et al (ed), Arms Across The Sea, (Washington, D. C: The Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 92.

[7]Cynthian A. Cannizzo, "Western Approaches to Military Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview" in Bruce E. Arlinghaus, (ed), Arms for Africa, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983), p.121.

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The period of the Cold War created several political functions for nuclear weapons. These include nuclear deterrence, alliance building and international prestige. [8]

However, Dougherty and Pfalgraffz have asserted that since the beginning of the atomic era, many voices have maintained that humanity faces complete annihilation and that the advent of nuclear technology has created an imperative requirement for a fundamental transformation of the international system. [9]

Though , the need to impose constraints on war has always been one of the daunting challenges that had always faced humankind right from the ancient times to present contemporary era, it has however, become a subject of vital importance In this nuclear age .[10]

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[8]Michael Roskin and Nicholas Berry, An Introduction to International Relations , Vol. 11, (New Jersey: Prentice –Hall 1990), p. 269.

[9]James E. Dougherty and I. Pfalzgraff, Contending Theories in International Relations , (New York: Harper & Row,[10]Herbert M. Levine, (ed), World Politics Debated: A Reader in Contemporary Issues,(New York:McGraw-Hill Book Co. , 1983), pp. 277-278.

As a means of reducing the threat of nuclear holocaust, scholars of international politics who are supportive of nuclear deterrence have argued that deterrence brings about crisis stability' since both parties concerned are quite conscious of the mutual destruction involved. Nevertheless, the critiques of deterrence theory have maintained that apart from the fact that it is less helpful in understanding the outcome of long- rage disputes, it also overestimates the rationality of decision- makers, who might encounter a lot of problems when trying to integrate large amounts of information in a crisis. [11]

Though, the two Superpowers did not prove quite reckless during the Cold War in hurling threats of nuclear attack as one might be led to believe that they would, deterrence therefore, to a large extent can be said to have been successful owing to the fact that the United states and the former Soviet Union were able to devise rules governing strategic interactions which minimized the risks of direct nuclear war. [12]

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[11]Dougherty and Pfatzgraff, op. cit. pp. 288-289.

[12]Ibid., p.289.

Since deterrence could not be completely trusted to be effective all the time, a radical proposal that would bring about a moderation in the thinking and behavior of governments within the international system was proposed. This proposal borders on General and Complete Disarmament (GCD).

The General Disarmament proposal presupposes a willingness on the part of nations to relinquish their primary prerogative of providing for their own defense and of entrusting their security to a new world-wide political organization.[13] Both Superpowers tabled their proposals for General and Complete Disarmament in the United Nations, the former Soviet Union in 1959 and the United States in 1961.

The proponents of general and complete disarmament are of the view that the only measure that could put a stop to the threatening nuclear war was only if nations achieved disarmament. [14]

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[13]Ibid., p. 390. Also a scholar like John Herz is of the opinion that states should give up the supervision of their respective securities to a supranational body that would supervise world security. See Roskin and Berry, Op.Cit., p.11.

[14]Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, op.cit. , p. 392.

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However, the proposal for General and Complete Disarmament could not be implemented because of the mutual suspicion between the Superpowers as well as the disagreement which bordered on the inspection of arms to be dismantled. Hence the impracticability of the General and Complete Disarmament necessitated a shift in the early 1960s from General and Complete disarmament to Arms control which was more modest.[15]

The task of this thesis, therefore, is to examine the issue of Arms control and World Peace. Arms control is arelative concept that entails the limitation of certain types of weaponry or the reduction of armaments. [16]Arms control policies usually aim at some kinds of restraints or regulation in the qualitative design, quantitative production, method of deployment, protection, control, transfer, and planned, threatened or actual use of military force and weapons.[17]Arms control policies may imply collaboration between adversary states which include formal agreement, tacit understanding, informal co-operationor unilateral decision taken with expectation of reciprocal action.

[15]Roskin and Berry, Op. cit., p. 408.

[16]Couloumbis and Wolfe, Op. cit., p. 190.

[17]Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, Op.cit., p . 395.

They may also embrace unilateral decision deemed worth taking even if the adversary does not respond simply because they enhance stability of the deterrent, controllability and security against unintended war.

1.2. <u>Statement of the Research Probllem</u>

There is a need to understand that the above research topic is a sensitive one. Obviously, the whole of humanity is quite aware of the dangers that the possession of nuclear armory by nation-states poses to the whole world.

The sensitivity of this topic comes to mind when one notices that despite the various treaties regulating the transfer of arms as well as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Superpowers, prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, sustained the tempo of nuclear proliferation through their policies.

Furthermore, since military capabilities are often acquired in secrecy, does this not in any way bring to the limelight the fact that attempts to control the development or the transfer of arms will remain illusory in so far a nation-states are primarily responsible for their national security? Indeed the relevance of this research topic cannot be overemphasized. There is the need to examine the following:

- Has the issue of Arms Control in anyway reduced the tensions within the international system?
- Can we critically affirm that Nation-States within the international system are in anyway engaging in Arms Control with a view to enhancing World Peace?

- Has the pulling out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by North Korea and Iran not a threat to World Peace?
- Nations possessing nuclear weapons and who are not signatories to the NPT treaty, are they not a threat to global peace?

- Since they are not subject to any international treaty regulating the deployment of their weapons, can we honestly say World Peace can be guaranteed?

These and many other pertinent questions are the issues that the above thesis will attempt to provide answers to.

1.3. Objectives of Study

The objective of this study is to examine the issue of Arms Control and World Peace.This is because since states are still the basic elements in the international society, this implies their being responsible for their national security. It is therefore imperative to look at the issue of Arms Control and World Peace in a World which still has States as its basic element and the building blocks of the international system.

1.4. Source of Data

To achieve the objectives of this work, extensive use of related literatures and journal publications on international affairs shall be made use of.

1.5. Theoretical framework: Conflict Management

In international politics, it is a known fact that conflict is a recurring character in states relations. Conflict management is only possible in connection with conflict analysis. This analysis may be an explicit, conscious, project; if not, it

will be undertaken unconsciously and on the basis of unexamined assumption.[18] indeed, it could be reasonably argued that the actions and inaction of states within the international society is owing to the influence of conflict. Therefore, conflict management as a theoretical framework is appropriate to this thesis because it tends to regulate tensions that evolve out of human relations in order to make sure that they not get out of hand. [19]Scholars of international politics have variously expressed what they perceive to be conflict. For instance, a scholar like Rose Stagner views conflict as a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being achievable by one or other, but not by both. [20]

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[18]Peter W. Black, "surprised by common sense: local Understanding and the management of conflict on Tobi, Republic of Belau" in Kevin Auruch et al, (ed),Conflict Resolution: Cross- Cultural Perspectives, (New York: Greenwood press, 1991), p. 145.

[19]The dynamic atmosphere is a product of human relations which has two factors co-operation and conflict. Co-operation is not problematic while conflict is hence the mechanism for managing or regulating conflict is evolved so as to regulate the intensity of conflict.

[20]Ross Stagner, Psychological Aspects of international conflicts, (California: books –Cole Publishing company, 1967), p. 19

The argument here is that it is a common phenomenon that actors within the international system do sometimes aim to achieve certain personalized goals which are entirely different from their various national goals and that in achieving this, they all apply the state apparatus as a means to achieving an end.

This is usually propelled by the psychological disposition of the actors. Indeed, while state values and national interests may not necessarily be conflictual, the personal values and goals of actors might be the source of international conflict.

Another scholar in the person of Joseph Frankel is of the opinion that conflicts do occur when two or more people or groups of people, including states, carry out acts which are mutually incompatible. [21]

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[21]See Joseph Frankel, <u>Contemporary International Theory And the Behaviour of States</u>, (London: Oxford University press, 1973), p.8.

Kenneth Boulding also opinionated that conflict can be described as a situation of competitions in which parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other.[22] From the above points of view, one could argue that the incompatibility of the national interest of nation-states within the international system can lead to the occurrence of conflict. It must however, be noted that international conflict is distinct and different from other conflicts such as intra-national conflict. International conflict is a little more than a special case study of conflict because it has some peculiarities of its own conditioned by the nature of the environment within which it takes place.

Akindele for instance maintains that Kenneth Boulding identified three of such peculiarities. First, that in international life, there is alternation between two forms of conflict, covert and overt conflicts. Covert conflict reigns supreme during peace; and overt conflict reigns during war. Secondly, that international covert conflict is governed by the threat system- threat of

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[22]R.A. Akindele, "conflict Theory, Conflict Behaviour and conflict control in the international system: A Theoretical survey and Analysis" in <u>Nigerian Journal of International Affairs</u>, Vol. 13, No.1, 1987, p.4.

punishment, the threat of conquest and the threat of annihilation'. Thirdly, that international conflict in which the superpowers are directly and competitively involved threatens humanity with extinction.[23] These three peculiarities, according to Akindele, are the results of the nature of the international system as pointed out by Boulding.

Though, international conflict is often taken to be largely destructive it is however, an erroneous opinion because the dialectic of conflict and co-operation is at work in all societies and that conflict perform certain functions for the maintenance, change and integration of the society.[24]In other words, in as much as conflict can be said to be dysfunctional, it can equally be said to be constructive because conflict sometimes is that umpire that acts as a check against state dominance, international dictatorship and power hegemony in the international system. Hence conflict is not undesirable in the international system.

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[23] Ibid., p.7

[24] Ibid., p. 9.

The changing nature of the world is largelydue to conflict which has been instrumental to the changingpower structure in the international system. Conflict then is a necessary condition for change and dynamism. Hence the absence of conflict might imply two things: (1) The non-interaction among human being, (which according to Thomas Aquinas negates human nature).[25] (2) A complete consensus about condition of human actions as they occur.[26]

Conflict management then can be a collection of various methods of reducing tensions and managing conflict among states in the international system.Akindele proceeded to formulate some imperative conditions under which an effective regulation of conflict is possible. For him, such condition will include the following:

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[25]Francis Ishola Ogunmodede, <u>Chief Obafemi Awolowo Socio-Political Philosophy: A Critical International</u>, (Unpublished), Ph.D. Thesis, Pontifical Urban University Rome, 1985,p. 87.

[26]Ralph Goldman, Journal of Conflict Resolutions, Vol. 10, 1966, P. 328.

(i)   Therecognition by parties to a conflict of the necessity and reality of conflict, since the attempt to obliterate lines of conflict by ready ideologies of harmony and unity in effect serves to increase rather than decrease the violence of conflict manifestation.

(ii)   The mutual recognition of the parties in a conflict situation. The conflict groups must be visibly organized, and

(iii) The existence of rules and norms recognized by parties in a conflict situation. In this sense,though international law to a large extent has no legal binding character, it performs symbolic functions for the regulation of conflicts. [27] Conflict management can be said to bethe theoretical framework appropriate for understanding this thesis, because since the conflicts between the Superpowers has largely been that of ideological conflict, measures of reducing armaments have been embarked on by the Superpowers with the aim of using that as a tool of controlling or managing the conflict between them so as avoid a devastating nuclear war.

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[27]Akindele, Op. cit. 10.

Though, it is of utmost importance to note that conflict cannot totally be eradicated from the international system, it must however, be known that actual conflict among states often resemble mixtures of fights, games and debates, with this or that element predominating in the combination at different times and places. The art of diplomats, governments and respectable citizens then consists in managing these international conflicts so as to keep them within tolerable bounds; to safeguard as far as possible the current national interests while these interests themselves continue to evolve and change; to gain time and strength and to ensure national survival. [28]

1.7. Organization of Work

This dissertation is divided into six Chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which discusses the background to the study, the justification of study as well as the objectives of the research and sources of data. It also discusses conflict management as a theoretical framework for this thesis.

Chapter two discusses the Strategies of Military Capability as well as the Cold War and Arms race and equally attempts to discuss the rationale for arms race.

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[28]Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, (2nd Edition), (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 164.

Chapter three examines the nature of Arms Control, the historical background to the talk for peace, various strategies and ways through which arms control was carried out since 1945, arms control verification as well as the impact of peace talks on world peace.

Chapter four attempts to look into the agitations for a new world order in which Arms Control measures can be effective with a view to enhancing world peace.

Chapter five examines Arms Control and World Peace in a post Cold War era. This will examine whether the issue of arms control has been a myth or a reality and to what extent can world peace be guaranteed despite the end of the Cold War and bipolar politics.

Chapter six attempts to discuss the role of the U.N in the pursuit of Arms control by nation-States and its effect on world peace. This chapter will also give a summary of the work and the conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

<u>THE STRATEGIES OF MILITARY CAPABILITY</u>

2.1. <u>The strategies of military capability</u>

The viewthat nation-states constitute the basic element in the international society [29] implies that nation- states differ form one another both in size and endowment which might be military and economic. As long as states pursue varied policies and national interest, they cannot but equally be the custodian of their respective national security. And in attempting to protect their respective security, nation-states embark on acquiring military capability.

Legally and politically, the world is divided into jurisdictions defined by state boundaries, and the highest form of authority is that of the Nation-state. Moreover, the primary political loyalty that most people have is to the nation-state, and the nation state is the basic unit or building block of the global system. Thus, if there is a political unit whose security needs to be guaranteed, it is the nation –states.[30] From this perspective, anything that enhances the

[29]Calvocoress, Op.Cit., p.[30]Donald M. Snow, <u>National Security: Enduring problems of U.S. Defence Policy</u>, (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1987),p.4.

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security of the nation-state is beneficial and anything that detracts from the security is harmful.

It is pertinent to note that the acquisition of military capability especially of nuclear technology by most nation-states and the Third World States is often shrouded in secrecy and deception for reasons bordering on international backlash.[31]

The fundamental motivation to seek weapon is based on the perception that national security will be improved. Most nations prefer the possession of nuclear weapons as a sign of their military capability because the devises are highly destructive and confer symbolic status.[32]

While attempting to corroborate the view that military capability confers

[31]C. Bassey, "Nigeria, African Security and The Nuclear Option: A Research Note" in Bodija Journal, Vol. No. 2. June, 1990, p. 61.

[32]John M. Deutch, "The Nuclear Threat", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 4, 1992. P. 61.

Status on a nation-state, Andrew Pierre aptly notes:

the nuclear decision is likely to be made in many

countries for reasons quite separate from a national

calculation of security requirements. These include factors

of prestige, the desire to achieve regional dominance or to

catch up with another state in the area.[33]

The acquisition of military capability or force remains a relevant and necessary part of the world in which we live. The nature of the international system is such that nations simply cannot do without some level of military capability if they are to avoid being victimized by others. The international system largely remains characterized by anarchy under the mantle of sovereignty. And as long as sovereignty remains the system's basic organization principle, then self-help will form a prominent basis for protecting or promoting vital national interests. That means that military power will remain a necessary part of national assets.[34]

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[33]Andrew Pierre, <u>The Global Politics of Arms Sales</u>, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 30.

[34]Snow, Op. Cit. , p. 175.

The development of military capability by nation–states follows a logic which is separate from the patterns of amity and enmity among states. Although such patterns accelerate military developments, as during war, or strongly affect particular cases, as in the Anglo-German race prior to 1914, they do not fundamentally determine the scientific, technologicaland organizational imperatives which enable states to acquire military capabilities. Rather problems in states relations provide the demand which stimulates militaryImprovement .[39]

If a country's military capabilities are inadequate, it risks communicating that it is unwilling to invest the resources necessary to protect its interest and therefore, may be unwilling to fight to protectthose interests. Thus military policies that appear inadequate for deterrence or defense are thus doubly dangerous. This is because it leaves the defender vulnerable to attack and raises doubt about the defenders resolve. By contrast, adequate military capabilities avoid jeopardizing the defender's credibility, even if acquired

[35]Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear: The National Security Problems in International Relations, (New Delhi: Transasis Publishers, 1983), p. 158.

throughco-operation methods. When a defensive strategy satisfies the defenders military requirement, it also protects its credibility.[36]

But traditionally, the uses into which states put their military capability have been divided into two categories. The first use is for deterrence. Here military power is maintained to dissuade others from using military force.Presumably nation-states do this through the use of threat. The second use to which military capability is put is for war fighting.[37]

The contemporary era has witnessed the invention and the subsequent possession of nuclear weapons by nation- states. This has tended to increase the military capability of the possessing states as well as enabling them to help themselves better than other states.[38]

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[36]Charles L. Glaser," Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spirits and Deterrence Models" in World Politics : A Quarterly Journal of international Relations, Vol.44, No. 4, July 1992, p. 509.

[37]Snow, Op. Cit. , p. 176.

[38]Robert J. Art, "The Role of Military Power in International Relations" in National Security Affairs: Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Issues,(New York: Transaction Books, 1982), p. 34.

Nuclear weapons therefore, have revolutionized war and our perception of the use of military instrument of power. [39]

The military capability of a nation-state therefore, has a political significance. This is because military policies that are offensive and unilateral are generally considered more competitive while those that are defensive and bilateral are considered more co-operative.

Hence military policies that convince the adversary that the defender is interested in expansion usually generate bad political result which decreases the adversary's security.

The adversary, in order to restore its security,often adopts dangerous foreign and military policies.[40]

Though, nation- state may develop their military capability indigenously, sometimes, they acquire military capability through arms transfer. Bruce E. Arlinghaus captures this view when he says:

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[39]Snow, op. cit., p. 175.

[40]Glaser, Op. Cit. , p. 498.

While the transfer of arms represent only one part

of what has come to be generally understood as military

assistance, it forms the most significant portion in terms

of both expense and political influence. Increasingly, these

transfers, regardless of source or means of financing,

have come to shape all other aspects of military aid

and assistance, since the acquisition of weapons systems

determines both the form and scope of military

growth and modernization in recipient countries .[41]

The above quotation points to the fact that military capability of a state can be bolstered through arms transfer.

The denial of the continuous relevance of states acquiring military capability will be a mirage and a wishful thinking because were the need to maintain a military force and a defense policy not universal, there would be nations

[41]Bruce E. Arlinghaus, "Linkage and Leverage in African Arms Transfer" in Bruce E. Arlinghaus (ed), Arms Transfer for Africa, (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983) p.3.

In the World that did not possess armed forces, but there is hardly a nation-state that does not maintain, however minute, a military force. [42] Though, states acquire military capability in order to be able to safeguard their national interests, however, in the final analysis, a nation's military capability depends heavily on the health of its economic structure.[43] This largely lies in the fact that a nation without strong economic structure is not likely to acquire any meaningful military capability and if it does acquire military capability despite its weak economic structure, it will reflect in the improvement of its citizens.

2.2. The Cold War and Arms Race

The Second World War ended with an act which contained the two central elements in the Cold War: the advent of nuclear weapons and Russo-American rivalry.[44] Karl Von Clausewitz defined war as the continuation of policy by other means. By extension, the Cold War can defined as the warfare by other

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[42]Snow, Op. Cit., p. 19.

[43] Ibid., p. 17.

[44]Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., p. 2.

(non-lethal) means.[45]Nevertheless, warfare it was and the stakes were monumental. Geopolitically, the struggle in the first instance, was for control over the Eurasian landmass and eventually, even for global preponderance.[46]

Although, the origins of the Soviet-American rivalry could be trace to the 1917, Bolshevik revolution, the Cold War effectively began in 1947, shortly after the Second World War, when the United States introduced the Truman doctrine of containment, to check the communist expansionist policy, especially in Eastern Europe. [47]

It is pertinent to note that the architects and operators of the rival Cold War coalitions were of the opinion that they were elaborating structures whose foundation had been set by the heavy hand of World history.

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[45]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Cold War and it's After Math" in Foreign <u>Affairs</u>, Vol. No. 4, 1992, P. 31.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Mannix Abang Nyiam, <u>The United nations and The New World Order</u> ,(Unpublished), M.Sc. thesis in the Department of political Science, 1991, p. 74.

The Russians, schooled in the Marxist historical materialism, saw the two coalitions as the international expression of the inevitable worldwide conflict between the capitalists and working classes. Western political leaders, particularly the American, reluctantly adopted a kind of historical determinism of their own as a rationale for their virtual abandonment of the liberal, cooperative world-view which underlay their support of the United Nations system.[48]

The ideological conflict that sharply characterized the Cold War ideologically motivated conception of social organizations and even of the human being itself. Not only geo-politics but philosophy- in the deepest sense of the self definition of humankind was very much at issue. [49]

 The period of the Cold War characterized the division of Europe into irregular segments appertaining to the two principal victors, the United States and the defunct Soviet Union. These two powers continued for a while to talk in terms

[48]Seyom Brown, New Forces in World politics, (Washington: the Brookings institution, 1974), p.8.

[49] Calvocoressi Op. Cit., p.3.

of their alliance, and they were specifically to collaborate in the governance of the German and Austrian territories which they and their allies had conquered. The few surviving neutrals had no impact on this developing pattern. Former Yugoslavia challenged the pattern and asserted a kind of neutralism which was supported by Nehru's India and later adopted by Nasser's Egypt, was to play an increasing role in the evolving polities of the Cold War. The focus of international politics during the Cold War was Europe, and the dominating eventwas the ultimate division of the continent by the abandonment of German unity and the creation of the two new German states. Thereafter, Europe remained territorially stable and politically almost. [50]

The Cold War initial phase, which lasted until after Stalin's death in March 1953, depicted both super powers as being motivated more by fear than by aggressive designs, but each also perceived the other as, indeed intent on aggression.

The Kremlin government, which was headed by Stalin, was concerned then with how to keep and digest their principal war gain which was to control

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[50] Bizezinski, Op. Cit., p. 31

Central Europe while avoiding a premature coalition with the ascending Western power, American.

Stalin was also convinced that the West world seek to contest his primacy in Central Europe. He interpreted the Western demands for democratic election as an effort to inject a Trojan horse into his domain.

Equally, during the first phase, the West also maintained a defense posture. The West condemned the Soviet subjugation of Central Europe but did not contest it. Then the Berlin in 1947 was perceived as the beginning of a Soviet westward push, meant to force the West not only out of Berlin itself but also out of Germany. The Korean War was not merely minimally viewed as a diversionary offensive tactic, preliminary to the central showdown in Europe, but also as part of the effort to complete the expulsion of America from the mainland of Asia and an effort to intimidate Japan.[51]

The death of Stalin brought this first phase of the Cold War to an end. Not only were both sides ready for a respite, but the West seemed poised for an offensive. This offensive was the policy of liberation that was proclaimed by the American government. America and her allies were able to establish the

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[51]Ibid., p. 36.

North Atlantic Treaty organization in 1945 and entrusted the organization with the task of marshalling out West Europe's defense against the Red army of the defunct Soviet Union.But when West Germany joined NATO in 1955, the Russians responded by establishing a military alliance and command system – the Warsaw Pact –that was considered a mirror image of NATO:[52]

The second major phase, with various ups and downs including some temporary Soviet set-backs, lasted almost twenty years, from the 1950s to the late 1970s. Although there were brief periods of Western tactical assertiveness as well as occasional "cease fires", the Cold War on the geostrategic level during this phase was characterized by an offensive Soviet posture. It was marked by boastful assertions of Soviet politico-military influence in the Middle East and by the successive acquisition of the highly symbolic but potentially geostrategically important base in Cuba. This involved two brief but dangerous United States-Soviet confrontations, one in Berlin and the other in Cuba, both precipitated by Soviet assertiveness. [53]

[52]William H Mc Neil, The pursuit of power: technology, Armed Force and society since A.D. 1000, (Chicago: university of Chicago press, 1982), p. 366.

[53]Bizezinski, Op. Cit., p. 38.

This phase of the Cold War witnessed accelerated strategic buildup between both super powers. The Russians, being acquainted with the fact that the United States possessed nuclear weapons were not willing to remain indefinitely at the mercy of American bombers. Stalin spared no effortin achieving atomic capability and in 1949, five months after NATO was established, the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear device.

This provoked the surprise and dismay of the American government. However, Russian powers in science, technology, engineering and weapons design was further demonstrated by the next round of the post war arms race.   In   1950, the American government reacted to the loss of its atomic monopoly by deciding, reluctantly, to press ahead with the development of a far more terrible weapon, the fusion or H- bomb. The Russians kept peace, exploding their hydrogen bomb only nine months after the United States in November, 1952, had used Eniwetok atoll in the pacific for its first experimental test of the fusion reaction. [54]

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[54]McNeill, Op. Cit., p. 366.

Though complex in construction, hydrogen warheads could readily be made far lighter than the first clumby uranium and plutonium bomb. This made rockets an obvious and preferred instrument for their delivery. No means of intercepting a speedy rocket existed, and Germany's bombardment of England by V-2s in 1944 had shown how effective such weapons could be.

The USSR invested heavily in a new navy during the 1960s as well as in rocketing and space vehicles. In all probability, military research and development in the Soviet Union more or less matched the sum allocated to the same purpose in the United States.

The development of spy satellites from the 1960's onward gave each side sure and complete access to information about the other's missile installation on land. However, satellite surveillance at once dispelled many uncertainties aboutSoviet missile. This was because the satellite brought to the lime-light the fact that the missile gap was mythical. The Soviet had not in fact yet

invested in expensive rocket arrays poised to attack American cities, even though their capacity to do so had been proved.[55]During the 1960s' therefore, each watched while the other installed inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to match those they were themselves emplacing. Simultaneously, each power built and deployed submarines capable of lying silent beneath the sea for weeks at a time before launching atomic warheads from below the surface.

Clearly, by the beginning of the 1970s, substantial equality had been achieved in the sense that each power was in a position to wreak such damage on the other that building missile seemed wasteful. [56]in other words, both super powers maintained a posture of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which according to Adeniran "has long been achieved by means of long –range missiles, bombers armed with thermo-nuclearweapons, and Polaris –Trident (TRIAD)". [57]

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[55]John Lewis Gaddis, "containment: it's past and future in Richard A. Melanson (ed), Neither Cold War nor Detente?: Soviet-American Relations in the 1980s,(Virginia: The University of Virginia, 1982), p . 3

[56]McNeil, Op.Cit., p. 371.

[57]Adeniran, Op. Cit., p. 675.

As an attempt to curb the menace that might be precipitated by the arms race between the two superpowers, a five-year Strategic Arms limitation Treaty (SALT) signed in 1972, accordingly set a ceiling on such weaponry. This did not however halt the arms race. Research and development teams merely shifted attention to other kinds of weapons not mentioned in the treaty for the good reason that they did not exist.

By the end of the 1970s, therefore, several new weapons systems were ready to make the transition from experimental laboratories to production lines. But which weapons to build and how much of the nation's resources to commit to the escalation of arms race remained, 1981, a disputed matter in the United States. No doubt, similar disputes were in progress within the defunct Soviet Union, even though public airing of alternative, such as was necessary in the United States to persuade congress to vote funds, did not take place.[58]

At this juncture, it must be noted that the arms race between the two Super powers encouraged nuclear proliferation. Though, the exact number of States

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[58] McNeil, Op. Cit., p. 372.

that possessed atomic warheads or other means to deliver them remained a secret, only six states have exploded warheads in public, these include United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain, China and India. [59] But several others have been widely suspected of possessing warheads manufactured from plutonium produced in nuclear power plants. [60]

Though, arms race between the two Superpowers dominated the second phase of the Cold War; the final phase of the Cold War, roughly from 1979 until 1991 was marked by the West's gradual recapture of the ideological initiative by the eruption of the philosophical and political crisis in the Soviet camp and by the final and decisive push by the United States in the arms race. This phase lasted slightly more than a decade.

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[59]Between 16 July 1945 and 31 December 1979, known Atomic explosions were as follows: U.S.A. 667; USSR, 447; France, 97; U.K. 33; China, 26; and India, 1. Cf. McNeill, Ibid., p. 375.

[60]Adeniran, Op. Cit., p.677. Also it must be noted that in 1979 no fewer thirty- six countries bad nuclear power plants within their borders capable of producing fissionable material. Efforts to monitor and control the use of such materials by the U.S and other suppliers were fragile to say the least.

The historically dramatic turnabout was precipitated by three   critical cases of Soviet over–stretch. Geopolitically, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan inDecember 1979, apparently taken on the assumption that the United States would not react, propelled the United States to adopt, for the first time ever during the Cold War, a policy directly supporting actions aimed at killing Soviet troops.

The Carter administration not only undertook immediately to support the Mujahedeen, but it also quietly put together, a coalition embracing Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Britain, on behalf of Afghanistan's resistance. Equally important was the American public guarantee of Pakistan's security against any major Soviet military attack, thereby creating a sanctuary for guerillas. [61]   The scale andquality of the United States support steadily expanded during the 1980s, under the subsequent Regan administration.

Furthermore, the United States qualitatively expanded its relationship with China. As early as 1980, United States-Chinese cooperation assumed a more direct strategic dimension, with sensitive undertaking not only towards

[61]Bizezinski, Op.Cit. p. 42

Afghanistan but also on other matters. Thus the Soviet Union faced the geopolitical menace of a counter encirclement.

The massive United States defense buildup of the early 1980's including the decision to proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), both shocked the Soviets and equally strained their resources. Its scale, momentum and technological daring had been totally unexpected in Moscow.[62]

By 1983, a genuine war scare began to develop in the Kremlin, with the United States seen as bent perhaps even on a military solution. And then by the middle of the decade, it dawned on Soviet leaders that they could neither match nor keep up with the American efforts.

The human rights campaign and the arms buildup thus became the mutually reinforcing central prongs of a United States response that not only blunted the Soviet offensive but also intensified the crisis of the Soviet political and socio-economic system itself.

The Cold War eventually came to an end as a result of the domestic

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[62]Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., p. 47. Also see Edward Reiss, The Strategic Defense Initiative (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 7

reformswhich failed to revitalize the Soviet system but merely brought to the surface its weaknesses.

Equally, the arms race had exhausted the Soviet economy, while refuting its ideological expectations. Gorbachev's willingness to tolerate what he thought would be unlimited changes in East-Central Europe in order to be able to carry out his own reforms precipitated, not the emergence of more popularly endorsed and reformist leadership but eventually the collapse of the Soviet system[63].

2.3. The Rationale for the Arms Race

There is the existence of a rationale for arms competition among the super powers and other nation-states.

Some scholars of international politics are of the opinion that arms race leads to war. This however, is disputable in the sense that though arms races may result in war, not all wars are the result of arms races. There is no evidence

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[63]Bizezinski, Op.Cit., p. 44.

that arms races preceded the Russo- Japanese War (1904-1905). The Korean War (1950-1953), the Vietnam War (1967-1973) or the British-Argentine war over the Falkland's (1983).[64]

Arms race may bepart of a process of competitive modernization among states seeking to preserve the status quo. [65] Each fears falling behind the others in keeping weapons technologically up –to –date.[66]Or it may be part of a political struggle between a status quo state and a revisionist state. In this context, the former's decision to match the latter's increase in capability sends political massage: it refuses to acquiesce in a major shift of the power balance.

The resulting arms race among states is a measure of their political rivalry. The arms race did not produce this rivalry, nor will the race end until there is some political settlement of these powers differences.

[64]John Spanier, Games Nations play, (India: Macmillan India, 1990),p. 352.

[65]It must be noted that both the United States and the Defunct Soviet Union engaged in arms race not only to acquire superior military technology but as well as using the arms race to preserve the status quo and each other's respective sphere of influence

[66]Spanier , Op. Cit., p. 352.

The arms race in brief is a test of national will, especially on the part of the status quo power.

The rationale behind the arms race between the two Superpowers embarked on during the Cold War stemmed from theirmutual suspicion of each other's intentions as well as the uncertainties of the technological advances made by both powers.[67]   Both super powers embarked on arms race not only to guarantee the security of their respective domain or spheres of influence but also not to be falling behind in terms of modern technological acquisition.

In the next chapter, we shall endeavour to look into the nature of Arms control as well as the various strategies and conference negotiations by which both super-powers attempted to effect reduction in their armaments as well as its impact on world peace.

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[67] Ibid., p. 353.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NATURE OF ARMS CONTROL

3.1. The Nature of Arms Control

The need to contain the proliferation of arms as a result of their threat to humankind's existence has always been the sole reason why nation-states strive to control the procurement of arms. Commonly conceived, arms control is viewed as the alternative to arms competitions or arms race.[68] Arms control is a relative concept that entails the limitations of certain types of weaponry or the reduction of armaments.[69] Arms control policies usually aim at some kind of restraints or regulation in the qualitative production, method of deployment, protection, control, transfer, and planned, threatened or actual use of military forces or weaponry.[70]

It is pertinent to note that arms control policies may imply the collaboration between adversary states which include formal agreement, tacit understanding, informal co-operationorunilateral decisions taken with

[68]Snow, Op. Cit., p. 227.

[69]Coloumbis and Wolfe, Op. Cit., p. 190.

[70]Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, Op. Cit., p. 395.

expectationof reciprocal action. They may also embrace unilateral decisions deemed worth taking even if the adversary does not respond simply because they enhance stability of the deterrent, controllability and security against unintended war.[71]

The traditional values of arms control efforts therefore lies in containing the expense of continuing armaments and in reducing both the likelihood and consequences of a breakdown of deterrence. [72]. In the nuclear arena the purpose of arms control is to reinforce deterrence. Arms control must be viewed as a part of overall nuclear strategy. When deterrence is best viewed by limiting, reducing, or even eliminating nuclear arms, then arms control negotiations and agreements complement and enhance national security policy .[73]

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[71]Ibid., p. 396.

[72]Snow, Op. Cit., 227.

[73]Ibid.

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3.2. <u>Historical Background to the Talk for Peace</u>

The danger posed by the acquisition of nuclear weaponry by the two super –
powers as well as the arms race for the acquisition of superior military
capabilities by the super-powers during the Cold War brought to the limelight,
the annihilation that humanity faces in contemporary times. Dougherty and
Pfalzgraff were quite aware of this when they asserted that:

> since the atomic era, many voices have urgently
>
> warned that humanity faces "a choice between the
>
> quick and the dead" and that the advent of
>
> nuclear weapons technology has created the
>
> Imperative requirement for a fundamental

transformation of the international system.[74]

It is pertinent to note that despite the whole cry about the dangers posed by
nuclear weapons, no substantial changes of any kind which may be deemed
essential occurred. And since nation-states remained the basic unit of political

[74]Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, Op. Cit., p. 389.

organization, nuclear proliferation therefore, became the phenomenal preoccupation of the technologically more developed countries.[75]. Ali Mazrui was able to note that nuclear proliferation constituted a process of military democratization when he said that:

It seeks to break the monopolies in weaponry

In the hands of the Northern warlords. Nuclear

Proliferation also seeks to break secret

Societies based on forbidden knowledge under

The control of the West and the Soviet block.[76]

The effort to canvass for a halt to the arms race between the Superpowers, the non- proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the disarmament of existing nuclear arsenals become the focus of various peace movement in Europe and America.[77]

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[75]Adeniran, op. cit., p. 675.

[76]Ali Mazrui, The African Condition, (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. 136.

[77]Jinmi Adisa, "Europe's Peace Movement: the Dilemma of Deterrence" in Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 13, No.1 1987.

But then how do we examine historically the quest for peace between the Superpowers after the Second World War?

Historical background to the talk for peace can be traced to the post- war disarmament discussion which began in 1946. It began with an American proposal, known as the Baruch plan, after its proposer, Bernard Baruch who proposed the complete international ownership and control of the sources of nuclear energy as well as placing all atomic matters under an international agency. The United Nations Atomic Energy Committee did maintain that such a plan was practicable. It was however, politically unattainable.

This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union during the period of deteriorating Soviet-American relations in the 1940s as a thinly veiled American attempt to impede Soviet research efforts to produce a nuclear bomb while the United State retained the expertise in that area [78].

The USSR later presented its counter proposals for a ban on the manufacture and the use of nuclear weapons and the immediate destruction of existing ones (which were exclusively American). The Russian's demand for immediate

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[78]Snow, Op. Cit., P. 235.

destruction was unacceptable to the Americans who insisted that the creation of international machinery was of paramount importance. Both the U.S. and the former U.S.S.R's proposals were however, irreconcilable.

In 1951, the United States, Britain and France attempted to revive these discussions. Though the Baruch plan was tacitly dropped, the Russians spurned Western proposals, maintained their opposition to international intervention in their internal affairs and seemed resolute in preserving their advantage in non-nuclear armament.

In 1952, the three Western powers proposed quantitative limits for the armed power of all states. However, it was not until after the death of Stalin, the end of the Korean War and the explosion of the Russian hydrogen bomb that any progress was discernible. By this time advancing technology and, in the U.S., the search for a new strategy by a new administration had produced a diversification of nuclear weapons large and small and intensive testing of them. These tests led in turn to the worldwide alarm about the effects of radio- active fallouts, especially after the American tests in the pacific in 1954 which was believed to have killed some Japanese fishermen, poisoned vast

number of fish and infected the area of some 7,000 square miles. [79]

 In 1954, Britain and France proffered a new plan which was designed to reconcile the differing American and Russian priorities in a step- by-step disarmament process in order to achieve World Peace. This initiative had the effect of restoring negotiations. In 1955, the Russians proposed a plan beginning with the reduction in conventional forces and then in nuclear stocks and leading to the elimination of bases on foreign soil, a cut –off in nuclear production, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and a conference on test ban testing.

The former U.S.S.R. also accepted quantitative manpower ceiling, thereby embarrassing the United States whose worldwide commitments demanded larger forces than those envisaged. The United States on the other hand proposed in return higher ceiling and an 'open skies' inspection license whereby each side would keep the other under permanent observation from aircraft or satellite in orbit round the globe. The United States also pressed for an international control organ- even if subject to a veto. It rejected the idea of

[79]Calvocoressi, Op. Cit. P. 29.

aban on the use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. The 1955 negotiations had no immediate outcome partly as a result of the preoccupation with the re-arming of Western Germany. This was subsequently followed by the 1956-57 abortive discussion of the various plans for local disengagement in Europe and arms control scheme advanced by the U.S.

In 1957, there was a cessation by tacit agreement of nuclear tests partly as a consequence of the satisfactory conclusion of series of American and Russian tests at that time as well as some preliminary examination of the possibility of a more formal and permanent ban. [80]

At this point, it is necessary to maintain that though the two principal powers concurrently shared the same approach to a test ban, they also sponsored plans for general and complete disarmament.

The most radical proposals for modifications in the thinking and behaviour of governments were the sponsoring of the General and Complete Disarmament. The Soviet Union and the United States tabled proposals for General and

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[80]Ibid.

Complete Disarmament in the United Nations. The Russians tabled their proposals in 1959 and the United States in 1961. [81] The proposals for the General and Complete Disarmament were not generally accepted as a feasible proposal because both the scholarly and the military policy community saw it as a proposal that was antithetical to national security.

A second problem was that a large portion of the relevant scientific community was engaged in atomic research and did not want to see its effort shackled. Though some opposed the entire enterprise or part of it, however, the objections were overcome by a coalition of policy makers and atomic scientists.

The third problem was also that of verification. It must be noted that in an era before the first man-made satellite had been lofted into orbit, the ability to monitor compliance was very limited. The only available means were espionage, remote sensing and over flight. In fact, President Eisenhower proposed his "open skies" idea to allow over flight as a means of monitoring in

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[81]Ibid.

1955, and it was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union. Some aerial reconnaissance was conducted by high-flying U-2 aircraft in the 1950s but that practice came to a halt when the Soviets shot down and captured U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1960.

A fourth and related problem was the general level of the U.S.- Soviet relations during the period. Especially in the 1940s and well into the 1950s, the Cold War was at its peak. The competition between the Superpowers was viewed as increasingly intractable and pervasive, with no room for compromise or co-operation.

By the end of this period, things had changed substantially enough to allow an agreement. Although, it was not universally embraced, the limited test ban treaty (LTBT), which banned the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, was not viewed as a major threat to national security. It was not a disarmament scheme and therefore did not have that form of objection. Instead, it was argued that it would enhance security by making it more difficult for countries that did not already possess the bomb to conduct the testing necessary to develop nuclear capability. Though, this argument

appealed to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, [82] the Scandinavian countries and Canada saw the test ban treaty as a step in the direction of reducing tensions in particular and promoting World Peace in general. [83]

Finally, in attempting to talk about both Superpowers attempting to achieve world peace, there is that urgent need to mention the Cuban crisis. It must be noted that while the confrontation was important for a variety of reasons, it had special significance in the area of strategic arms. The Cuban crisis almost made the United States and formerSoviet Union to come closer to nuclear war than they ever had before, and the experience was profoundly sobering.

One particularly important realization was the horrible prospects of possible nuclear war, and hence that the two Super-Powers had a common had compelling interest in its avoidance. The coincidence of the Soviet – American interest resulted in a period of co-operation in strategic arms limitation. [84]

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[82] Snow, Op. Cit., pp. 236-237.

[83] Bernard J. Firestone, <u>The Quest for Nuclear Stability</u> (Connecticut: Greenwood press, 1982), p.105.

[84] Snow, Op. Cit.,p. 238.

3.3. Variough Strategies And Ways Through Which Arms

Control Was Carried Out Since 1945 (Conference Negotiations)

Although, it has been stated elsewhere in this study that attempts by the two super-powers to embark on arms control in the 1940s and 1950s was basically impracticable as a result of the fact that the Cold War was at its peak, the formulation of the limited test ban treaty (LTBT) can be said to be the beginning of a serious attempt by both powers to embark on arms control.

It is pertinent to note that the success of the limited test ban treaty (LTBT) was a marked improvement of the U.S.-Soviet relations generally, in which arms control served as the centre piece of the phenomenon known in the United States as detente. The heart of arms control became the Strategic Arms Limitation Talk (SALT) which occupied a center stage for nearly a decade. [85]

The Superpowers having realized that their co-operation in averting nuclear confrontation was both possible and certainly in the national interests of their respective countries, embarked on a number of agreements that supplemented LTBT through negotiations. This followed a spate of agreements

[85]Ibid.

not to do things that would be inimical to the interests of both parties. Also the Superpowers agreed not plant nuclear weapons on the seabed, not to use nuclear weapons in an accidental or unauthorized way, not to militarize the Moon, not to put nuclear weapons into orbit round the earth, as well as not to introduce nuclear weapons into Latin America. Of these agreements, the one with the most enduring interest was the outer space Treaty of 1967, because of its prohibition against stationing nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in space. However, this became a point of contention with regards to the strategic defense initiative (SDI).[86]

It is of utmost importance to note that in talking of the various strategies and ways through which arms control was carried out, it becomes imperative to maintain that there were two initiatives. One was the SALT and the other was the negotiation that led to the Nuclear War Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The basic factor underlying the NPT was the desire to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons to states that did not already possess them. The logic behind the NPT therefore stemmed from the belief that a state that does not possess

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[86]Ibid.

nuclear weapons cannot use them. Hence possessing them was likely to bring about the occurrence of nuclear war.

The U.S. and the former Soviet Union proposed the NPT andsigned it in 1968. The NPT created a nuclear caste system and provided that states possessing unclear weapons could keep them, but that they must work towards arms control and disarmament as well as promising not to aid the non-possessors of nuclear weapons becoming possessors. While the non possessors, for their part, promised not to try to gain the bomb in return for assistance in exploiting peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

It must however, be noted that not all states subscribed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The signatories included all the nuclear powers expect France and the Peoples Republic of China, the state that could physically build nuclear weapons but that had decided against it such as Japan, West Germany and Sweden as well as those who had no earthly prospect of ever being able to build them. The more troubling category was the non-signatories, because that list contained almost all the state normally designated as prime candidates to produce nuclear weapons. These include

India, Pakistan, South Africa, Israel, Argentina, and Brazil.[87]

Despite the formulation of the NPT, strategic Arms Limitation Talk (SALT) however, was the center piece. The negotiations began in 1969 under the auspices of President Nixon. Though the negotiations were supposed to have begun in1968, it was however suspended as a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 1972, the discussion produced a series of agreements cumulatively known as SALT I followed by an interim second step signed by Brezhnev and President Ford at Vladivostok in 1974. This culminated in the ill –fated SALT II in 1979.

Though SALT I agreements were signed in Moscow by Nixon and Brezhnev, SALT I consisted of four separate agreements, two were of major significance and two were of minor and specific import.

The first major agreement was the interim Agreement on offensive Arms. Under this pact, both sides agreed to an arms freeze, promising not to increase the number of nuclear missile launchers (rockets or planes) for a five –year period[88]. Here, the emphasis was on launchers rather than on warheads

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[87]Ibid., p. 239. Also see Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., p. 36.

[88]Spanier, Op. Cit., p. 344.

because these could easily be verified by counting the number of ICBM silos, nuclear missile submarine tubes, and strategic aircraft by satellite. Though, there was no numerical listing of the number of launchers in the agreement, it however had a five-year life span, so as to provide enough time for more precise numerical limits to be negotiated.

The second major agreement was the Antiballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty. The purpose of this agreement, which is still in force, was to place limits on the number of ABMs either side could deploy, under its provision, each side was limited to two ABM sites, one around the national capital and one around a missile field at least 1500 kilometers away. It was also agreed that on each side, there should be no more than hundred launchers and the same number of interceptor rockets. By a protocol signed in 1974, each country was limited to a single ABM site either around its capital or elsewhere. [89]

It must be understood that the purpose of the treaty was to prevent the

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[89]Snow, Op. Cit., p. 240.

deployment of comprehensive Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) networks. Thus ABM Treaty proponents hoped and believed that they had killed Missile defenses altogether. The treaty did not, however, restrain continuous efforts short of system and component testing efforts that had quite obviously gone forward. The ABM treaty was the most successful arms control agreement not only because it apparently constrained a potential new direction in arms race but also because it has been in effect for so long.

Aside from this, the other agreements generally included under the SALT I were less spectacular. Under one of these the hot line between Moscow and Washington, which allowed for direct communication between the American President and the Soviet Premier through teletype transmission, was upgraded from the transatlantic cable to satellite transmission. Under these final agreements, procedures were established to deal with accidental nuclear war[90].

It is important to note that SALT I mandated a SALT process. Owing to the fact that the interim Agreement on offensive Arms did not produce concrete limits on arms levels, supplementary negotiation were required.

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[90]Ibid.

Some sense of urgency was created by the fact that the offensive agreement had a life span of live years.Immediately after SALT I was signed, negotiations began. However, they were complicated by the fact that three different men had occupied the Presidency of the United States during the five year life of the agreement, nevertheless, the first step toward SALT II was achieved in November ,1974 when Gerald Ford and Leonid Brezhnev Signed the Vladivostok accords in that Soviet city. This was an interim step towards in second comprehensive agreement.

The Vladivostok Accord, in essence limited the total number of strategic launchers which include intercontinental ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launching Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and heavy strategic bombers. Each side was limited to an aggregate of no more than 2,400 launchers. In addition, each side was to be constrained to no more than 1,320 Multiple independently Targetable Reentry vehicles (MIRVED) missiles, and a further sublimit was placed on modern heavy missiles[91].

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[91]Paul H. Nitze, "Assuming Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente" in Essays on Arms Control and National Security, published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, (Washington D.C: Government printing office, 1976), p. 105.

In essence, therefore, the VladivostokAccord formalized numerically the freeze that had been imposed by the original offensive arms agreement. The only area where change in the capabilities of the two sides was allowed was MIRV. At that point, the U.S. had started MIRVing its forces but was well below the permitted limit, whereas the Soviet did not begin fielding MIRVs until 1975.

It is of importance to note that it took nearly four and a half years before the Vladivostok Accord could be translated into a full- blown SALT II agreement, which was signed by Brezhnev and Carter, though Carter introduced some proposals that would have lowered the overall launcher ceiling by 25 percent, to a total of 1,800 launchers each.

The Soviets however, rejected the proposal since it would have force them to dismantle more forces, including some new and sophisticated systems than would the United States. Hence they rejected the proposal out of hand and negotiations that had reached advanced stage grounded to a halt[92].

The SALT II Treaty as eventually fashioned consisted of three distinct elements. The first was the treaty itself, a document which limited offensive weapons system and which was intended to remain in force until the end of 1985.

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[92]Snow, Op. Cit., p. 241.

Its provisions represented something of a compromise between the Vladivostok and the Carter numbers. According to its provisions, the total number of launchers was lowered from the Vladivostok limit of 2,400 to 2,250 thereby qualifying the treaty as a shallow- cut reduction agreement. At the same time, the heavy ICBM limit remained at 508, and the total permissible number of MIRVs stayed at 1,320.

There were however, sublimits on MIRVs: no more than 820 MIRVed ICBMs could be deployed, nor could more than 1,200 total MIRVs be fielded, since this sublimit was extended to cover both MIRVs and cruise missile carriers.

The second aspect of the SALT II agreement was its protocols. These were temporary measures intended to place restrictions on qualitative improvement in weaponry by restraining research and development and systems upgrading. This represented a new direction in the SALT process and included such things as a restriction on the number of new missiles that could be redeployed to one apiece- testing limits that would prohibit flight- testing of cruise missiles with MIRVs, and the like .[93]

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[93]Ibid.

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Finally, there was a statement of principles that catalogued the areas where agreement had not been possible, and which would form the agenda for the expected SALT III negotiations that would follow reduction- including efforts at arms reduction.

Though, SALT II was never ratified, but it did not disappear altogether. Despite the failure to make it a formal law, both the U.S. and the USSR continued to abide basically by its provisions so that the limits imposed by the treaty formed the basic characteristics of arsenals on which negotiations resumed on March 1985[94].

The major initiative of the Reagan administration during its first term was the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). The stated purpose of these discussions was on actual reduction in the destructive capabilities of the two arsenals. [95]

However, START never truly got off the ground as a result of the soured U.S-Soviet relations in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics and the grain embargo.

[94]Spanier Op. Cit,. p. 351.

[95] Ibid.

Furthermore, the initiation of the strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by the Reagan administrationthough it was rejected by the Soviets, it was however, amajor focus of the 1985 summit and was a major source of division in the Geneva talks. [96]

In the Geneva talks, the new talks consisted of three tiers of separate but clearly related discussions. Each of the three levels of discussion had its own set of negotiators.

One set of discussion was devoted to the question of the strategic offensive weapons. The Reagan administration's thrust in these talks was toward the reduction of these arms, and this set of talks could be viewed as the extension of the SALT/ START process, since basically the same kind of arms and concerns were being addressed by the negotiating teams.

The other two sets of negotiations broke new grounds. The second set dealt specifically with the strategic Defense initiative (SDI) and the prospect that the various research programmes included in the SDI might result in a workable strategic defense, probably in space.

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[96]Snow, Op. Cit., pp. 246-247.

The third level of talks encompassed the controversial intermediate nuclear force (INF).This was the most emotional area of discussion, since it dealt with nuclear forces opposing each other in Europe, a major issue on the continent. Also talks were bound to deal in substance with such controversial weapons system as the Soviet Ss-20 Mobile MIRVed rockets and the American Pershing II mobile Missiles and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM).

Finally, it must be noted that the Geneva talks was beset by a lot of suspicion. Besides that, it also had the verification problem as well as its failure in not involving other nuclear weapon- possessing states even though the Soviet authorities indicated to hold separate talks with France and Britain at a later date.[97]

3.4 Arms Control Verification

The quest for reduction of arms build-up, particularly disarmament or arms limitation cannot be meaningful unless these actions are undertaken in the interest of a state's national security. It must be noted that in the past,

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[97]Coloumbis and Wolfe, Op. Cit., p.194

armscontrol agreements have been most effective when reached in an atmosphere of relative confidence that they would be respected by their signatories. Hence in order to create such a feeling of confidence, representatives of nation-states have always insisted upon provision of verification[98].

But then what is verifications? In the language of strategists, particularly arms controllers, verification refers to the assessment of compliance with the provisions of arms control treaties and agreements[99]its primary functions are to detect violations of agreements, to discourage potential violators especially through effective inspection and detection mechanisms and to build confidence among the signatories of arms control agreements that will pave the way for further progress in arms control.

Verification proposals have always had to contend with an important problem.

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[98]See the U.S. Arms control and Disarmament Agency's verification: The Crucial Element of Arms control, publication 85, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p.2.

[99]Bassey, Op.Cit. , p. 61.

This problem stems from the fact that nation-states do like to keep the number, quality and variety of their military capability secret in order to enhance their national security[100]. Effective verification therefore, cannot be achieved unless they can be based only on such sensitive information. Though the more advanced a country's intelligence capabilities are, the more it is likely that the country will be confident enough to enter into agreements concerning the mutual limiting of military capabilities and defense expenditure.

A reflection back to the Cold War era brings to the limelight a fundamental division in the approaches toward verification adopted by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This division was certainly deepened by the attempts of each side to score propaganda pointsby offering the types of proposals that would obviously be unacceptable to the adversary.

While in general, America's arms control proposals whether providing for the transfer of all nuclear weapons to an international authority, or calling for sizeable reduction in conventional weapons and force levels- were invariably accompanied by verification proposals, such as demands for frequent on site inspections of military installations, the Soviet in turn steadfastly opposed any

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[100]Calvocoressi, Op. Cit., pp. 28-29.

system of on–site inspections that would violate its sovereignty. In their view such would amount to legalized espionage. Instead, the Soviets made ponderous proposals for total and complete disarmament or called for the creation of nuclear-weapons free zones especially in central Europe and including both German states. [101]

The two Superpowers held firmly to their respective positions until the late 1950s, when some significant progress was registered in the arms control field. The mellowing in both Soviet and American attitudes regarding inspection and verification was a function of changes in the international system. First, there was thaw in the Cold War that decreased somewhat the level of mutual suspicion. Second, and perhaps more important, there was a marked change of attitude toward military deterrence in both countries.

Though, in the pre-nuclear international system, secrecy about one's military capabilities had been considered an important strategic asset. But with the advent of nuclear weaponry, it became apparent to strategists on both sides that deterrence was more effective if the potential adversary knew quite specifically one's nuclear capabilities.

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[101]Coloumbis and Wolfe, op. cit., p. 196.

Consequently, with the signing of the Antarctic treaty in 1959, the former USSR accepted in principle the on-site inspection of its scientific installations in the southern pole regions. The U.S.S.R. had remained insistent however, on forbidding on –site inspection on Soviet territory. The U.S. for its part retreated from its demand for verification by agreeing to the 1963 limited test ban treaty. As a result of this treaty, the U.S. stopped insisting upon on-site inspections. Instead, it settled on the use of its own national intelligence monitoring and detection services to evaluate compliance by the Soviet Union.[102]

Verification techniques available to nation- states can range widely in complexity and obtrusiveness. The less obstructive techniques involve intelligence practices such as photographic, radar, and electronic surveillance, seismic-detection instruments, high-sensitivity, air sampling techniques, and highly computerized data processing and data-analysis systems. The more obtrusive technique involves ad hoc inspection facilities, fixed observation posts, mobile inspection teams, and unmanned monitoring instruments [103].

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[102]Ibid.

[103] Ibid.

It must be noted that verification practices involving on-site inspection despite the Soviet Union's refusal to permit such inspections on its territory are gaining gradual acceptance. For instance, the Sinai II disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1975 involved buffer areas, demilitarized zones, U.N. observation teams, American communication specialists and continuous monitoring and verification. Equally the signatories to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty subscribed to periodic on-site inspections by the international Atomic Energy Agency.

Finally, though verification is an important way of examining to what extent states conform to treaties governing disarmament and arms control, a truly effective system of international arms control and verification awaits the development of political authorities and institutions. [104]

3.5. The Impact of Peace Talks on World Peace

The use to which nuclear bomb was put during the second world war and which subsequently brought the war to an end brought to limelight the

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[104]Dougherty and Pfalzgraff, Op. Cit., p.389

annihilation that the whole of humanity faces as a result of the emergence of the nuclear bomb.[105]

Through various peace movement that sprung up in Europe and America organized themselves into groups that were interested in bringing to the fore the dreaded arms race that came to characterize the relationship between the two Superpowers during the Cold War as well as the dangers of nuclear weapons, all these were able to make the Superpowers to embark on various peace talks which led to negotiations and agreements. [106]

Furthermore, these negotiations may not have achieved something substantial, it was able to allow the Super Powers to realize that their co-operation in averting nuclear confrontation was not only in their national interests but was necessary if world peace was to be achieved.

The various negotiation embarked on by the Superpowers can in a way be said to have encouraged world peace since both powers came to see the need not

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[105]Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Arms Control After the Cold war" in <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, Vo. 68, No. 5, 1989, p. 49.

[106]Snow, Op. Cit., p. 236.

to achieve some arms control measures but also came to see the need of

avoiding anything that would be inimical to each other's interest.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE AGITATIONS FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER

4.1.   What is the New World Order

The arms race between the Superpowers during the Cold War as well as the attendant danger that nuclear arms race posed to humankind was one of the factors that necessitated or brought about the agitation for a new world order that would be free from arms competition among nation-states within the international system.

According to Joseph Nye the term world order can used indifferent ways in the discussion of politics occurring among sovereign states balancing each other's power, World Order for them then, is the product of a stable distribution of power among the major states. The liberals on the other hand look at relations among peoples as well as states. They see World Order arising from broad values like democracy and human rights as well as from international law and institutions such as the United Nations.[107]

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[107]Joseph S. Nye Jr. "What New World Order" in Foreign Affairs ,Vol. 71, No. 2, 1992, p. 82.

The various epochs of international politics has always been characterized by a World Order. A World Order has always emerged, with guiding principles for the conduct of international affairs. Thus, the world had witnessed the emergence of multipolar and bipolar world order as the structural basis for international relations, while a unipolar structure is imminent in contemporary international system.[108]

Essentially, therefore, the Pre-Cold War World was multipolar with powerful European countries acting as principal and devisive factors in international system.This was the period that was characterized by multiple balance of power in which a large number of states fairly evenly matched and were able to form alignment which corresponded with the changing perception of international politics.[109] During the multipolar World Order, the balance of power held sway.[110]

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[108]Nyiam, Op. Cit., p. 73.

[109]Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace, (London Methuen & co. Ltd., 1960), p. 9.

[110]Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Power" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, 1992, p. 64.

The multipolar World Order was characterized by more restrained national behavior and was generally felt to be more conducive to preserving peace. This was the period in international politics in which major actors aligned on one side or the other and in which friends or foes were easy to determine.[111]

However, the World Wars diminished the capabilities of the major actors in the multipolar arrangement, giving rise to two continental states, the United States of America and the defunct Soviet Union, which emerged as Super Powers and leaders of their respective continents, they were later to become power rivals.

Although, the origin of the Soviet–American rivalry could be traced to the1917 Bolshevik revolution, the Cold War effectively began in 1947, shortly after the World War II,when the United States introduced the Truman doctrine of containment, to check the communist expansionist policy especially in Eastern Europe. Throughout the Cold War era, global issues were predominantly determined by the interests and actions of the major world powers and their allies.

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[111] Spanier, Op. Cit., p. 121.

Their interests in the international system were however, highly incompatible and confrontational. [112]

The bipolar World Order was essentially dominated by bipolar politics which was a zero-sum game where any gain for one was a loss for the other. Thus, when after the World War II, the Soviets sought to turn Iran into a satellite, the United States and Britain countered the effort. And when the Soviets later put pressure on turkey, Britain initially lent that country its support as well. In the winter of 1946-47, Britain however collapsed from the exhaustion of two World Wars, leaving the U.S. to take over Britain's role and become Moscow's chief adversary. The symbol of America's new rolewas the 1947 Truman doctrine in which the American president committed the nation to the political independence and territorial integrity of both Turkey and Greece.[113]

In short, during the Cold War, the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), containment policy, the Reagan doctrine

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[113]Gaddis, Op. Cit. , p. 2

[113] Spanier, Op. Cit. 125

andlargely American defense budgets were elements of the American and West European response to the stimulus of Soviet expansion and force.[114]

Equally, the East European Empire and the Brezhnev Doctrine symbolized the Soviet Union's will to conquest, its contempt for democratic self determination and self-government and its reliance on force as an ordinary instrument of foreign policy. [115]

Furthermore, the bipolar World Order was characterized by the arms race between both Superpowers which involved the pursuit of power through the acquisition of military capability. Despite the arms race between the two Superpowers, deterrence was used between 1945 to 1989, to prevent or regulate the relationship between the two Superpowers. Thus, thebipolar World Order was saved from lapsing into chaos. [116]

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[114]Jean J Kirkpatrick, "Beyond The Cold War" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 4, 1992, p. 3.

[115]Ibid

[116]Rosecrance, Op. Cit. , p. 65.

Though the bipolar World Order was characterized by the rivalry between the Superpowers designated as the Cold War as well as the arms race or the quest for the acquisition of military capability, the bipolar World Order was equally characterized by the search for an ideology by some nation-state notably in the Third World Countries that did not share in the Cold War that raged between the Superpowers. The 1950s saw the first celebration of "non –alignment" as an explicit attempt to escape from the logic of bipolarity. In the 1960s, more regimes were released from colonization and with others sought to assert their independence from "imperialism"[117]

Though, the two dominant ideologies, Capitalism and Communism dominated relations in the international system. The bipolar era also witnessedthe emergence of a global relationship that assumed a multipolar character as well as the emergence of ideological pluralism that became a fact of life. This ideological pluralism was made evident by several facts. One was the co-existence of the two principal social system, Capitalism and Socialism and the realization by theUnited States and the Soviet Union that co-existence was not

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[117]Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in The New World" in <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, Vol. 71. No. 1, 1992, p. 24

simply a matter of choice. Secondly, ideological pluralism became morepervasive with the emergence of the movement of the non- aligned countries that did not align with the dominant states in the bipolar World Order. And the resolve by the non-aligned countries that existed invirtually every corner of the globe, to purse their own part of social, political and economic

development.[118]

Bipolarity continued to make sense only in Europe but even there, it was coming under severe pressure. The demise of the Cold War also signaled the demise of the bipolar World Order. In the mid-1980s, the Communist leader, President Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledged theStagnation of the communist system and offered the slogans of perestroika and glasnost which were designed to promote reformist option through radical reorientation of the Soviet domestic policies.[119]

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[118]C.H. Grant, "Ideological Pluralism in the Caribbean: Challenges and Prospects" in The Round Table, No. 290, 1984, p. 174.

[119]Freedman, Op. Cit. , p. 84.

The New World Order emerged as a result of the collapse of the Soviet empire in Europe in 1989. The rapid decline of the Soviet Union caused the end of the bipolar order that had persisted for nearly half of the century.[120]

With the demise of the Cold War and consequently the bipolar World Order, a New International Order inevitably emerged along the framework of Unipolarity. The circumstances paved the way for the United States to reassert its role as the major dominant actor in constructing a New World Order.

The Bush administration's decision to pursue the military option in the Gulf War, while ignoring all diplomatic openings, has underscored the character of the U.S. –dominated world order.[121]

It must be noted that the military option chosen by the United States under the guise of United Nation's resolution on the Gulf crisis would not have attained its fruition if the Soviet Union had not collapsed. Hence the demise of

[120]Nye, Op. Cit. , p. 84.

[121]Nyiam, Op. Cit. , p. 77.

theSoviet Union signaled the demise of the Cold War and the end of the bipolar World Order. Thus, allowing totaking shape, the structure of an emerging Unipolar World Order.

In our next chapter, we shall be looking at Arms control and World Peace. In doing this, we shall be dealing with the myth or the reality of arms control and world peace in a post-Cold War World.

CHAPTER FIVE

Arms Control and World Peace

5.1   The Myth or the reality of Arms control and World Peace

The view expressed by Dougherty and Pfalzgraph that the World has undergone no radical restructuring since nation-state remain the basic unit of political organization which have been strengthened by scientific–technological development in this era is a truism that remain indisputable.[122]

Indeed a nation-state is not likely to achieve its foreign policy and national interests within the international system if it is not sovereign. This is owing to the fact that sovereignty is the sole criterion that a nation-state must meet before it can achieve its policies within the international system.[123]

[122] Dougherty and Pfalzgraph, Op Cit, p. 389

[123]See Kenneth C. Okocha "Contemporary Relevance of the concept of sovereignty of states in Theories of International Relations, (Unpublished) Seminar paper presented in the Dept of Political Science, University of Ibadan, January 1994, typewritten P.I.

Though, there is that mutual dependence among nation-states within the international system, this does not in any way imply that their mutual dependence or interconnectedness means the loss of their sovereignty.[124]

It is therefore pertinentto note attempting to analyze Arms Control and World Peace has to be done by looking at the basic unit of political organization called the nation-state.

The bipolar World Order was dominated by bipolar politics as well as the unhealthy arms race which characterized the relationship between the Super-Powers during the bipolar World Order. However, the demise of the Cold War was equally a pointer to the demise of the bipolar World Order. [125]

Presently, we are in a unipolar World Order which emerged from the ruins of the bipolar era. Hence even in this unipolar era, the basic unit of political organization remains the nation-state which implies that nation-states are still the basic custodian of their respective national security.

[124]Alan James, "Contemporary Relevance of National Sovereignty" in Michael Leifer (ed) Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy,(London George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1972), p. 21.

[125]Freedman, Op. Cit p. 24.

The implication of this then is that the nation- state has the sole duty of guaranteeing its own security which means that it can embark on acquiring military capability as a means of protecting itself from external attack.

But then, since nation-states remain the basic political organization within the international system, is arms control a myth or reality?

There is ample evidence to buttress the fact that arms control has been more of a myth than reality. This is because since nation-states are the custodian of their various national security and since nation-states decide what their vital interests are, then it ought to be known that the issue of national security is overwhelmingly important to a state that it is unwilling to compromise it, hence a nation-state would rather go to war than be denied the right to acquire military capability which it would use to guarantee its security.[126]

It is relevant to maintain that the nuclear arms race spearheaded by the technologically developed countries hampers the issue of arms control and makes it more of a myth than reality. Indeed a scholar like Adeniran has observed that since the less developed countries are encouraged to join the nuclear arms race as a result of the transfer of technology by other more

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[126]Snow Op. Cit. , p. 9.

advanced and developed countries because of their quest for oil and other strategic minerals,[127] this itself points to the futility of attempting to persuade states to embark on disarmament and arms control measures.

Furthermore, the weakness of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) equally contributed to making the issue of arms control more of a myth than reality owing to the fact that some nation-states that were signatories to the treaty violated the provisions of the treaty. John M. Deutch was able to lay credence to this view when he says:

The world now knows, however that even though

Iraq signed to Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),

it managed to mount a massive covert Programme to

acquire nuclear and other weapons

of mass destruction. Government and international

 Organizations including (IAEA) were highly Ignorant of

Iraq's intentions and capabilities. While aspects of

the Iraqi cases are unique, it is widely acknowledged

that several in the Middle East, notably Iran,

Algeria and Libya are moving toward nuclear weapon

capability as is North Korea. [128]

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[127]Adeniran, Op. Cit., p. 675

[128]Deutch, Op. Cit., p. 120

It is of paramount importance to note that despite the end of the Cold War, the nations of East and South-East Asia are engaged in accelerating arms race which has significant implications for regional international security. The sale of American f-16 fighter jets to Taiwan and Russian SU-27 fighter jets to China are part of a large arms effort as both countries upgrade their own military production capabilities. It is relevant to observe that other countries in the region such as Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the two Koreas are high-tech military industries. Although these nations have generally managed to avoid direct combat with one another since the Vietnam War, continuing tension in Korea and a number of territorial disputes in the South China Sea area could provide the sparks to ignite regional conflagration.

The acceleration of regional arms race is made more worrisome by the absence of any regional arms control talks, such as those now underway in the Middle East, and by the growing technological process of the leading Asian powers .

Indeed, while most of the NATO and former Warsaw pact countries are reducing their military expenditures and slowing the development of new weapons, many East Asian countries are raising their military outlays by a

significant percentage and also investing in the procurement of modern munitions. [129]

More significantly, many of these countries are developing domestic arms industries that are expected to compete on equal terms with those of the more advanced western countries in the early years of the 21stcentury.

Thus, it is perhaps the emphasis on technology imports that sets the East Asian arms race apart from those in the Third world. While the nations of Africa, Latin America and the Middle East tend to import finished weapons systems from their major suppliers, the Pacific Rim countries generally seek the technology with which to manufacture arms of their own. Hence Taiwan will produce and assemble many f-16 components while it proceeds with the development of its indigenous Defensive fighter and a domestic variant of the patriot Missile. China equally is seeking technology to upgrade its j-7 and J-8 fighter planes and is negotiating with the Russians for Licensed manufacture of the MIG-31.

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[129]Michael T. Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race" in <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993.

Japan produces the F-15 under license from the McDonnell Douglas and is proceeding with co-development (with the United States) of its fighter support Experimental. South Korea has begun domestic production of the F-16 and manufactures many of its other combat systems. In addition to basic combat gear, the Pacific Rim nations also manufacture many of the communications, electronics and surveillance systems used by their militaries .[130]

Although one cannot deny the fact that the acquisition of military capability by nation-states is predicated on how strong or burgeoning their economic power is, it becomes pertinent to note that total military spending by Japan and the six newly industrialized countries (NIC) which are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand rose significantly from $31.7 billion in 1979 to $51. 4 billionin 1989 with an increase of 62 percent. More recent data suggest that military spending by these countries excluding Indonesia continued to rise in the new millennium.[131]

It must be pointed out that Asia is growing in geostrategic importance. Today several Asian countries are already among the largest defense spenders in the World. It is argued that while Europe and the U.S defense budgets have been

[130]Ibid. , p. 137.

[131]Snow, Op. Cit. , p. 17.

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decliningin recent years. It is pertinent to observe that the defense budgets of China, India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan from the year 2000 to 2011 increased astronomically. These countries collectively spent $224billion dollars on defense.[132]

It must be noted that up until 2005, Japan had the largest defense budget in Asia. However, since 2005, China has been the biggest spender on defense, having previously replaced India as the second largest spender in 2001.[133]As at 2009, China allocated $25.8billion dollars more than any other country to defense investment in 2009. This was commensurate with China's position as Asia's biggest and overall spender.[134]

It is pertinent to observe that because of China's burgeoning military power, Japan has approved a new defense plan aimed at checkmating China's military power in the region and the international community. A mid-term Defense programme totaling $276billion will be spent within the next five years and it is

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[132]Joachim Hofbaur, Priscilla Hermann and Sneha Raghaven, Asian Defense Spending, 2000-2011, (Washington D.C: CSIS, 2012, 2012), p. 1.

[133]Ibid.

[134]Ibid. , p. 29.

expected that average annual defense spending is expected to increase by about 0.1 percent. The new strategy adopted by Japan emphasizes dynamic defense capabilities which is anchored on mobility and rapid response by Self-Defense force.[135]

Laicie Heeley reports that in 2012, the U.S approved $645.7 billion in defense budget (fiscal year 2013). She argues that this number is six times more than China, 11 times more than Russia, 27 times more than Iran and 33 times more than Israel. The U.S military spending currently doubles that of all Asia combined. As at 2012, the U.S alone accounted for 41percent of total global military spending.[136]

It is pertinent to note that just recently as at November 2014, the U.S Defense Secretary proposed $1.5 billion to be used in improving Nuclear Weapon forces. This proposition has come under heavy criticism by Arms Control advocates who called the Defense Approach misguided and argued that steps should be taken to reduce nuclear arsenals rather than spending more on weaponry.

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[135]www.DEFENSE WORLD. NET

[136]Laicie Heeley, U.S. Defense Spending Vs Global Defense Spending in 2012, (Washington D.C: Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 2013).

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The view that arms control and world peace is more of a myth than reality is further supported by North Korea and Iran's apparent pursuit of nuclear weapon and their continuing refusal to open suspect nuclear facilities to international inspection. Although North Korea's nuclear activities are of greatest concern to South Korea and the United states, they also menace other countries in the area especially Japan and are an added spur to regional arms buildings.

Though the thrust of military development has focused on conventional weapons, Pacific Rim nations have also explored various options in the nuclear and chemical area. Only China now possesses a fully developed nuclear capability. Its nuclear arsenal currently consists of eight inter continental ballistic missiles (ICNMs), 60 intermediate –range ballistic submarine (IRBMs) and one nuclear power ballistic missile submarine, in addition, China has a force of some 200- nuclear –capable bombers.[137] Indeed a country like China is reluctant to give up arms race as indicated by its historical antipathy to nuclear arms control effort. [138]

[137]Klare, Op. Cit. , p. 138

[138]Ibid. , p. 148

Apart from China, North Korea has reportedly developed a nuclear weapons production complex. Since 1987, it has been operating a 30- megawatt gas-graphite research reactor at Yongbyon and spent fuel from this reactor has reportedly been reprocessed at an adjacent facility in order to extract small quantities of weapons- grade plutonium. [139] Although North Korean officials insist that the plutonium will be used for research purposes only, Western intelligence experts believe that the reprocessing facility was established as part of a long –term effort to acquire nuclear weaponsand that North Koreans may already have extracted and hidden a sufficient quantity of plutonium for one nuclear devise. Under pressure from the West, North Korea signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 and began opening its facilities to international inspection in 1992. Recently however, North Koreans blocked inspections of some facilities and on March 13, 1993, Pyongyang announced its intension to withdraw from the NPT. Thus precipitating a major crisis in the international nonproliferation effort that has remained unresolved.[140] The above facts have exhibited as futile the attempt to enforce arms control measures among states within the international system.

[139]Deutch, Op. Cit. , p. 131.

[140]Klare, Op. Cit. , p. 149.

Despite all that has been said about Arms Control and World Peace being more of a myth than reality, a scholar like Joseph Nye believes that in the post Cold War era, arms control may lead to major reductions in the forces of the Super-Powers. He believes that military forces even in this new era will still be needed because of the normal course of great power politics and because of the diffusion of destructive power. And moreover, there is always the prospect that the changes in the formerSoviet Union could be reversed.

Finally, he is of the view that the current period of improved bilateral relations provides an important opportunity for the United States and the former Soviet Union to work together with other countries to reinforce and establish regimes for dealing with the diffusion of power. The Super-Powers would have to pay more attention to the multilateral dimensions of Arms Control and more attention to the relationship between bilateral and multilateral Arms Control. As well as paying more attention to the relationship of Arms Control to regional political process.[141]

[141]Nye, Op. Cit., pp. 63-64

5.2.   <u>Space Technology and its Utility with regard to Military Capability</u>

The world is witnessing a marked increase in the usage of space technologies for military and in the post Cold War era. Stephen Cimbala argues that military command means the responsibility and accountability of getting results, including the battlefield success or the prevention of war if the object is to deter it. In the nuclear age, it surely is the objective of Super-Powers to deter nuclear war, probably to prevent crisis that might lead to any war between the Americans and the defunct Soviet forces to the extent possible[142] and in doing this, the use of space technology for military purposes have transformed modern day battlefield significantly.

The entire World witnessed with awe, the usage of space technologies by the US and its allied forces during the 1991 Gulf War. Subsequently, these technologies have been used with success during the Kosovo conflict and during the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). All these campaigns saw the intense use of space assets by the US and its allied forces[143].

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[142]Stephen J. Cimbala, <u>Strategic Impasse: Offence, Defense, and Deterrence Theory and Practice</u>, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p.5.

[143]Ajey Lele, <u>Strategic Technologies For The Military: Breaking New Frontiers</u>, (Delhi, India: Sage Publication, 2009), p. 71.

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Space technologies have the utility in regard to remote sensing, communication, navigation, meteorology, education, astronomy and so on. Conversely, these technologies inherently been dual-used technologies have a military dimension too. Satellites play a prominent role towards military communication and navigation. Also satellites are being used for many years for military purposes like intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance[144].

Space technology and space science involves significant financial and technological investments. The launcher technology, a technology used for putting satellites into space is closely associated with ballistic missile technology. At the global level, the technology transfer in this area has mostly remained a selective proposal. Hence both financial and technological limitations in the field have kept many states away from this technology.

It must however, be pointed out that unfortunately international collaboration is not always a trouble free situation. Ajey Lele argues that States are forced to undertake few decisions due to geopolitical compulsions, and then there are

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[144]Ibid.

[145]Ibid

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competition among the states. In the end, military demands of the states get precedence over other requirements. The states are not ready to share 'everything' with each other because of the inherent characteristic (dual-use) of space technology[145].

It is pertinent to note that modern military equipment is far more sophisticated and capable than equipment made a decade or more ago. This is especially true when such equipment is supported by the most modern precision-guided weapons and by area ordinance and supported by modern intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. It must be pointed out that the ability to modernize and modify older equipment is equally important, as is adequate maintenance[146].

While it is important to note that training, experience, and personal management development are critical intangibles that are hard to compare and virtually impossible to quantify, and which can differ from country to country and units to units. Countries differ strikingly in the demand they put on personal promotion and the trust and initiative given.

146Anthony H. Cordesman, <u>Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War</u>, (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security, 2006), P.22.

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Also it must be noted that though weapons are instruments used to obliterate, trounce or harm an enemy, since time immemorial human race has been involved in designing and developing various types of weapons for such purposes. Anything that is capable of causing damage, even psychological one to the enemy could be called a weapon. All weapons are non lethal and there exists a separate category of non-lethal weapon.[147]

Weapons systems are normally classified based on these facets: (a) who uses it, (b) what the target is, and (c) how it works. The categorization is also subject to the combat environment, in which the weapon or its platform is used. It could be land, water, atmosphere or space. The launch platform and the environment dictate facets of weapon designing. What it targets, refers to what type of target the weapon is designed to attack, that is whether weapon is anti-aircraft, anti-ship or anti-submarine. How it works, refers to the construction of the weapon and its operating procedure, that is, whether it is a biological, chemical or energy weapon.[148]

147Ajey Lele, Op. Cit. , p.71.

148ibid.

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It is pertinent to observe that modern day weapons use various forms of energy. All their lethality, say from nuclear energy to kinetic energy. A new breed of weaponry called DEW is expected to revolutionalize the 21st century, perhaps in a similar way nuclear weapons brought a revolution during World War II and the period thereafter.

Such weapons could be further categorized as laser, high-powered microwaves and partial beams. As Dong Beason posits, these are capable of preventing an enemy from conducting operations, either by destroying the targets or by stopping the enemy[149]. These weapons damage the target with electromagnetic power. However, a few of such weapons are available with developed militaries and many are under development/ conceptualization.

All this however, in any way does not remove the fact that part of mode of modern military warfare is the possibility of strategic information warfare as a new means by which international actors may wage war by directly attacking an adversary's information infrastructure[150].

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[149]Dong Beason, The E-Bomb, (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2005), p.214.

[150]Gregory J. Rattray, <u>Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace</u>, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), p. 2.

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Furthermore, in terms of states acquiring military capability, each state must choose whether to try and modernize its military forces in ways that will allow them to match some of the advances in conventional forces that make the revolution in military affairs, a challenge that requires both massive new investments and major improvements in training and manpower quality. The changes in the very nature of warfare that were demonstrated in the Gulf War of 1990/91 and demonstrated even more clearly in Iraq's defeat in 2003, force a rate of military change that goes far beyond traditional arms race that nations engage in to acquire military capability.[151]

5.3   <u>NANOTECHNOLOGY</u>

Nanotechnology is an emerging science of the 21st Century that concerns itself with the engineering of materials at the scale of the individual atoms and molecules. Nanophase materials, as they are sometimes called will often display novel properties because of the very precise way in which their component particles have been arranged or shaped.[152]

151Anthony H. Cordesman, Op. Cit. , p.3.

152John Robert Marlow, "Understanding Nanotechnology", http//www.scifid ensions.com/may04/digital.

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Nanotechnology has two different but important meanings. One is a broad, stretched version meaning any technology dealing with something less than 100 nanometers in size. The other is the original meaning- designing and building machines in which every atom and chemical bond is specified precisely.

It is pertinent to observe that the application of Nanotechnology in the development of weapons of warfare will further enhance the military capability of nations that have access to this technology. It will further revolutionalize the military and thereby further drawing humanity to the brink of self-extinction.

In the 21st Century, for the induction of any military technology, it is important to address two specific issues- arms control and likely environmental damages that such technology may cause. Issues related to the environment and global warming do not strictly form a part of the global discourse on defense but are extremely important and capable of stalling induction of any new technology in defense. It is extremely important to have knowledge about the

environmental concerns in regard to military technologies and the price involved in the acquisition of military capability.

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From the above analysis of current development in the field of Military Capability, Space Utility and Nanotechnology coupled with huge finances budgeted by nation-states on defense and the upgrading as well as the development of new weapons, all these point to the futility of Arms Control and World Peace. With huge allocation to defense research on the development of new weapons, we begin to begin to see how nation-states are further enriching their arsenal with new and developed weapons which could be deployed in warfareif and when necessary. All these actions by nation-states within the international system acutely undermine the desire for World Peace.

Having looked at Arms Control and World Peace as well as the issue of whether arms control and world peace has been more of a myth or reality, in the next chapter, we shall be looking at the role of the United Nations in the quest for Arms Control and World Peace.

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CHAPTER SIX

6.1   The Role of the U.N in the Quest for Arms Control and World Peace

That the World exists in a formal state of anarchy is a statement that cannot be overemphasized. This is because there is no international government. Nor is there sufficient interdependence or division of labour among states to transfer international relations into a social system akin to domestic affairs.[153]

Under prevailing circumstances, there are only three methods by which that anarchic system can be regulated or prevented from lapsing into chaos. The first is the traditional balance of power; the second is nuclear deterrence, and the third a rule by a Central coalition. Each of these systems has been employed at different times during the last two hundred years.[154]

It is pertinent to note that the balance of power held sway during most of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth   century. It was however, an inefficient equilibration of power relations. It also gave rise to both

[153]Rosecrance, op. cit., p. 64

[154]Ibid.

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World Wars in the last century. Under this system, nations found it difficult to respond credibly to an aggressive state. While the balancing   system at restraining conflict, did not fully control the aggressive policies of major nations.

Deterrence was used during the period of bipolarity from 1945 to 1989 and it was more successful. Through the threat of nuclear retaliation, the system constrained the behavior or the two Superpowers.

The third organizing method, rule by a central coalition had existed only briefly and episodically in the past two centuries, and is by far the most efficient peacekeeping devise. In the nineteenth century, the Concert of Europe functioned effectively from 1815 to 1822, and desultorily thereafter. After the World War 1, the League of Nations briefly received international attention and obedience.[155] Though the League was hampered from the outset by the absence of the United States, it was able to handle some disputes and situations with varying degree of success.

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[155]Ibid p. 65

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It was able to record a remarkable success in the field of socio-economic affairs as well as success in organizing World disarmament conferences which focused on Arms trade. World economic conferences held in June 1933 in London which gave cognizance to international trade that increased economic rivalry, the league however mirrored the lack of cooperative will among its members[156]

The various problems that beset the league subsequently led to its dissolution and the United Nations emerged as one world body that could fulfill the aspirations of the war time allies of the Second World War. Hence the United Nations emerged as a universal body whose machinery touches every phase of human existence.[157]

It is pertinent to note that the fathers of the United Nations were of the opinion that if global peace must be achieved and if international security must be maintained effectively, the role of the U.N must be well acknowledged and

[156]Nyiam. Op. Cit. p. 35.

[157]CLARK M. Eichelberger, Organizing for Peace; A Personal History of the

Founding of the United Nations (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 299.

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respected by all member nations in the emergent World Order. States must comply with the decisions of the organization no matter their strength and position in the international system.

In the defunct World Order, the U.N. met with both success and failure. It was able to prevent some international disputes from developing into major wars. It was able to secure freedom, independence and better way of life for many people in different parts of the World. But disagreements among member nations prevented the organization from effective peacekeeping. [158]

The hostile relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were largely perceived as the major obstacle to achieving disarmaments during the Cold War. The United Nations disarmament commission could not achieve much with respect to Disarmament and Arms Control largely as a result of the unfriendly relations between the super-powers.

Though the principal organ of the U.N. responsible for dealing with threat to

peace and security is the Security Council which is equally the supreme organ

[158]The World Book Encyclopedia Vol. 20, 184 p. 24.

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of the U.N. could also not achieve much during the Cold War because of the

gross misuse to which the Veto was put. The Veto Power was grossly misused

in the bipolar World structure to further the interests and perpetuate the

dominance of only the World powers and usually at the peril of majority

members. Hans Morgenthau must have captured this view when he

describesthe Security Council as a "holy alliance within a holy alliance". [159]

During the bipolar World Order, the U.N could not substantially achieve

disarmament because of the feud between both Superpowers.

It is relevant to note that with the New World Order envisioned by former

Presidents, Bush and Gorbachev which is to be founded on the rule of law and

the principle of collective security.[160] Some scholars have maintained that with

the breakup of the Soviet Union, the liberation of Eastern Europe, the Gulf War

and the rapprochementbetween the U.S. and Russia,[161] the U.N. will now be

able to achieve some disarmament. This is because the principle of collective

[159]Innis Claude Swords Into Plowshares, (New York Random House 164) p. 56

[160]Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin "The U.N in a New World order in

<u>Foreign Affairs vol. 70 No 2 1991 p. 6</u>

[161]Rosecrance op. cit., p. 65.

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security would impress it on members to support collectively the U.N. measures for attaining some levels of global disarmament and arms control.

The role of the U.N. therefore, in the quest for Arms Control and World Peace, scholars opined, would require a deliberate political judgment that can only be made by members of the Security Council acting collectively and will depend on some continuing commonality of interests among the five permanent members of the Security Council – the United Statesand Russia in particular.

The effectiveness of the U. N. in the quest for World Peace as well as in dealing with international security problems, Disarmaments and Arms Control will always be sensitive to the nature of relations between these two Super-powers.[162]

The healthy relationship between the Superpowers will not only enhance the U.N.'s ability to restore the status quo as it existed prior to a breach of peace, but also to change the parameters of the global order to something more favourable than existed under the previous status quo.[163]

[162]Nyiam op. cit. p. 98.

[163]Russett and Sutterlin, Op. Cit p. 82.

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6.2.   Summary and Conclusion

This thesis has attempted through the various chapters to discuss Arms Control and World Peace. It also brought to the limelight the view that though military capabilities of nation-states are often shrouded in secrecy and deception, nation-states, acquire military capability, especially nuclear weapons, not only as a means of enhancing and guaranteeing their respective security but also as a means of increasing their influence on other nation-states that have less military capability within the international system.

Admittedly, though the various epochs of international politics has always been dominated by a World Order, the bipolar World Order was not only characterized by the rivalry between the two Super-Powers but also by the arms race between the two Superpowers in their bid to outdo each other in terms of military capability. However, the bipolar World did not witness any meaningful reduction of arms by nation-states possessing nuclear armory.

Though the demise of the Cold War signaled the demise of the bipolar World structure and consequently allowed for the emergence of a new World Order that is unipolar or multipolar, nevertheless, the views expressed by some scholars of international relations that meaningful and genuine reduction of

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armaments can now be achieved as a result of the end of the rivalry between the Super-Powers tends to be a view clothed in illusion.

This is because since nation-states are still the basic units of political organisation within the international system, they cannot but seek weapons that will enhance or guarantee their respective national security. Hence attempting to achieve Arms Control with a view to achieving World Peace is beset with various difficulties.

The vehemence with which nation-states that are signatories to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty have consistently violated the NPT as well as the hostility often faced by officials of the international Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) when it comes to inspection of military arsenals of nation-states that are signatories to the NPT as exhibited in the case of North Korea and Iran who are members of the NPT all point to the futility of attempting to

meaningfully achieve some levels of Arms Control with a view to promoting World Peace.

It is pertinent to note that despite countervailing efforts to control proliferation by international regimes, such as IAEA, the technical information required to design and manufacture a nuclear device is now quite readily

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available, as is the necessary expertise. This trend has been considerably heightened in recent times by the increasing commercialization of nuclear technology and research/production facilities under the so-called atoms for peace clause of the NPT which explicitly commits (Article IV) the nuclear powers to aid the non-nuclear weapon states in the development of peaceful nuclear energy capabilities, including the fullest possible exchange of equipment.

As a consequence, acquisition of nuclear weaponry has now become a by-product of peaceful nuclear programmes and delivery systems, the by-product of peaceful space programmes. In terms of both money and manpower, national nuclear force can now be acquired at a relatively low cost as technological advances especially in laser enrichment and the burgeoning

market for nuclear materials and technology outside the framework of the NPT regime render existing international safeguards largely, ineffective.

Moreover, the attempt to achieve some measures of Arms Control is pretty made difficult as a result of the present arms race currently going on in Asia and the Middle East which is being aided by the developed countries despite the end of the Cold War. This is largely as a result of the fact that the

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developed countries support the proliferation of arms not only in terms of their need for export, need for oil or strategic mineral but also the need for access to other parts of the world.

But then we cannot say that because the failures of achieving meaningful measures of Arms Control outweigh the successes, then we should no longer pursue Disarmament and Arms Control.

Though, some scholars have previously advocated for Complete and General Disarmament, the call was however abandoned because of the impracticability of general and complete disarmament. Hence Arms Control a relative and modest concept was introduced as a strategic and defense policy.

While it must be noted that even though various conferences were held by the Super-Powers with respect to limiting arms, and even if these conferences did

not yield much fruit as was expected because of the mutual suspicion between Super-Powers, Arms Control was able to provide a psychological relief to a humanity that felt threatened by a nuclear holocaust in the event of a nuclear war occurring.

Although one cannot deny the fact that the necessity to embark on Arms Control during the Cold War was seriously hampered by the rivalry between

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the Superpowers, it is however, being expressed that since the Cold War has ended,the U.N. that was incapacitated for long when it comes to the issue of disarmament may now be able to lead the search for World Peace by collectively not only spearheading the need for nation-states to reduce their armaments but also by effectively maintaining such a posture.

Now that we are in a New World Order devoid of the rivalry and competition for areas or spheres of influence by the Superpowers, some meaningful measures of Arms Control with a view to enhancing World Peace can be achieved when nation-states show the sincerity and honesty of pursuing such a venture.

Arms control can to some extent be relatively achieved when the developed countries renounce their policies of supplying arms to developing countries in exchange for strategic minerals. Attempting to achieve some measures of arms control will not be effective if they maintain their posture of proliferating and aiding arms race as it is currently happening in Asia despite the end of the cold war.

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Furthermore, the resolve by nation-states to continuously allow their military arsenals to undergo inspection from time to time by IAEA officials will go a long way in bringing about some achievement of some arms control measures.

Perhaps, it is when nation-states show the seriousness and the purpose to pursue Arms Control that humanity might finally heave a sigh of relief because of the eradication of the threat that nuclear weapons poses to the world thereby ensuring World Peace.

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